A cluster of new studies allows us to put concrete numbers on what ODA cuts cost. A major Lancet study estimates tens of millions of excess deaths under current defunding trajectories. New conflict research links the USAID suspension directly to increased violence across Africa. Both findings are relevant to Switzerland, whose development cooperation is concentrated in health and in fragile, conflict-affected states. The evidence makes a strong case for protecting that spending.

Official development assistance has come under sustained pressure. Across the OECD, ODA is projected to fall by up to 17% in 2025 alone — on top of a 9% decline in 2024 — with further reductions expected in 2026. A cluster of new studies now allows us to assess what is at stake. This post summarises the emerging evidence on the health and conflict consequences of aid cuts, and draws out what it means for Swiss development cooperation.

ODA saves lives — and we can now measure how many

A major study published in The Lancet Global Health in February 2026 by Rasella et al. offers the most comprehensive evaluation to date of ODA’s impact on health. Drawing on longitudinal data from 93 low- and middle-income countries between 2002 and 2021, the study finds that high levels of ODA per capita were associated with a 23% reduction in all-cause mortality and a 39% reduction in under-5 mortality. The effects were largest for HIV/AIDS (70%), malaria (56%), neglected tropical diseases (54%), and malnutrition (56%) — gains that, scaled across two decades and dozens of countries, translate into tens of millions of lives.

The same study then projects forward. Under a severe defunding scenario — where ODA falls to minimal levels from 2026 onwards — the models estimate 22.6 million excess deaths by 2030, including 5.4 million children under five. Even a mild continuation of current downward trends implies 9.4 million excess deaths over the same period. The projections rest on two decades of retrospective data and, while inherently uncertain, the direction of the effect is not in serious dispute.

Aid withdrawal fuels conflict

Tan, Amarasinghe, and Ubilava (2026) exploit the abrupt USAID suspension of January 2025 as a natural experiment, comparing conflict trends in highly aid-dependent African countries against less exposed ones. They find a 12% increase in armed conflict between organised groups in the months following the suspension, and a delayed 10–14% rise in militia-perpetrated violence against civilians. A subsequent CGD analysis by Lee Crawfurd extended the dataset through the end of 2025 and found consistent results, estimating roughly 1,000 additional conflict-related deaths attributable to the cuts over the year. The effects in both analyses are concentrated in countries with weak state capacity, the contexts where Swiss development cooperation is most active.

These findings align with the broader research consensus synthesised in a 2026 IDOS policy brief by Fiedler et al., which concludes that abrupt aid reductions are demonstrably conflict-inducing. The mechanism is well understood: aid withdrawal weakens states relative to armed groups, reduces the opportunity cost of joining them, and collapses the informal arrangements that had previously kept conflict in check.

What this means for Switzerland

Switzerland is among the donors that have announced reductions. The studies above give policymakers something they rarely have: concrete, well-identified figures on what cuts actually cost. The Lancet study draws on 20 years of data across 93 countries; the conflict findings exploit a natural experiment with a clean identification strategy. Both point against cuts to ODA, particularly where the evidence base is as strong as in the studies reviewed here.

A recent Kiel Institute report on mutual interest development cooperation sharpens the case further. Its argument is that aid sustains political support when it generates returns on both sides — for recipient populations and for donor societies. Assessed against that standard, health and peace and governance spending both hold up well. Health ODA reduces pandemic spillover risks that affect Switzerland directly, builds the economic stability that sustains markets and partnerships, and supports an environment in which Swiss pharmaceutical and health industry investments can generate returns. Spending on peace and governance in fragile states reduces the displacement flows and humanitarian crises that donor countries end up financing at far greater cost once violence takes hold, and contributes to the regional stability on which Swiss trade and security interests depend. Cuts in these areas defer costs rather than eliminate them.

Health figures as a new focal area in the IZA-Strategie 2025–2028, and peace and governance have been longstanding Swiss priorities. The evidence reviewed here illustrates what ODA, directed well, can achieve — in lives, in stability, and in returns that reach donor countries as much as recipients. That is a strong basis on which to defend the budget.